Effects of Matching in Economics: Social Networks and the Marriage Market

Citation

Brayak, Travis Francis (2014). Effects of Matching in Economics: Social Networks and the Marriage Market.

Abstract

My dissertation investigates the effects of matching in Economics. The first chapter investigates matching as a marriage and finds that women's participation in the marriage market changed with the introduction of early contraceptive (Pill) access. I find that less-educated women delayed marriage in response to receiving early Pill access, but that more-educated women did not change their marriage timing in the short run. This led to heterogeneous indirect effects for both more- and less-educated women in terms of later-marriage outcomes, including marriage rates, spousal education, and spousal labor supply. The results highlight the complex ways the Pill altered the equilibrium in the marriage market. The second chapter investigate matching as a social network and finds that the social network in a school depends on the diversity in racial composition of the school. Individual in schools with higher racial diversity also have fewer friends, but for the remaining friends, a higher share of the friends are the same race as the student.

URL

http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1562514071?accountid=14244

Keyword(s)

Social sciences

Notes

Reference Type

Thesis/Dissertation

Book Title

Economics

Author(s)

Brayak, Travis Francis

Series Author(s)

Bharadwaj, Prashant Cullen Julie B.

Year Published

2014

Volume Number

3629613

Publisher

University of California, San Diego

City of Publication

Ann Arbor

ISSN/ISBN

9781321068108

DOI